"A lot of the new products and other things I put in place are starting to bear fruit now."

SCHINDLER: Speaking of Steve Jobs, do you feel he was straightforward in his dealings with you?
AMELIO: I wrote the book because I wanted to portray a very real, honest-to-goodness life experience of what I went through there, in this incredibly intense period of my life. I wanted to have the reader be able to get in my head and walk through the events as I did, and feel the emotions, the ups and downs, and hurts I felt. So I couldn't very well get a book that really gave somebody what it must have been like to be CEO of Apple at this time. That's what I was trying to get the average Joe to understand by reading this book.

That's the way I saw it. I saw Steve in that light. He disappointed me. I brought him into the company. I bought his company. I brought him into the inner circle. I gave him access to the whole company. I had him sit in my staff meetings. I had him make comments. We had dinner together. We talked frequently. We strategized together. And then to have that happen out of the clear blue sky was really disappointing.

SCHINDLER: Do you think the book makes a fair apportionment of blame?

"[Steve Jobs] disappointed me. I brought him into the inner circle. I gave him access to the whole company. We strategized together. And then to have that happen out of the clear blue sky was really disappointing."

AMELIO: I obviously think I did so accurately. These are the events as I saw them. This is the reader looking through my eyes. It is entirely possible that other people could have witnessed the same events and seen different things. I guess they're entitled to their opinions. I guess whatever I say isn't going to change their minds -- I think it is a pretty accurate portrayal.

In fact, I have talked to neutral third parties, people who weren't part of the religious war that tends to surround Apple and Microsoft, and they thought it was a pretty balanced treatment, and I think it is. C O N T I N U E D . . . 2 of 3
SCHINDLER: Was there a turning point, where a different decision could have altered the course?

"Never in its history had Apple had a string of six product introductions in a row that were on time and got rave reviews. Clearly things were starting to work, and that's the irony of this whole thing, that I was just starting to hit my stride during that last six months and it got undone. Too bad."

AMELIO: Let's recount what happened. If I divide my tenure into the first year and the last six months, there was no question that in the first year I was struggling. I was struggling to get the company back on a sound financial footing -- which I did, solve the quality problem -- which we did, to kill Copeland and come up with a viable operating system strategy -- which was incredibly difficult, and to begin trying to mold an effective executive team, and a culture within the corporation that would let us get results.

The last part is probably as important as any of the other items. It took me the better part of a year to figure out "how do you get results in Apple?" as opposed to National Semiconductor, or Rockwell, or any of the other places I'd been. And I have to admit, I lost some time on those issues. I did finally figure that out though, and during those last six months [there] was really a heck of a strong run. We introduced six new products, on time [to] rave reviews, meeting our quality standards. Everyone agreed they were super products. Up to and including Mac OS 8, which was something we defined the summer before, when we killed Copeland. I got the team together and led the team which defined OS 8, and it came out exactly on the day we said a year earlier we would release it.

I think that's a heck of an achievement. I think it says two things. One, I was beginning to be effective in getting the culture to change. Never in its history had Apple had a string of six product introductions in a row that were on time, and got rave reviews. Clearly things were starting to work, and that's the irony of this whole thing, that I was just starting to hit my stride during that last six months, and it got undone. Too bad.

SCHINDLER: At several points in the book, you describe the Apple corporate culture as dysfunctional. Did you turn it around? Can you turn that kind of culture around?

"[Jim Champee] described Apple's culture as "adolescent. A case of arrested development," was the phrase he used. And I think there's a lot of truth in that."

AMELIO: You can -- it just takes time. I told the board this was a three- to five-year mission. You're not going to put in the habits and disciplines you need overnight. I thought I had a commitment from the board, that they were going to give me at least three years to do that, and maybe longer. It didn't work out that way. The culture was one of contrarianism. Jim Champee described that very well in a recent article he wrote. He described Apple's culture as "adolescent -- a case of arrested development," was the phrase he used. And I think there's a lot of truth in that.

It goes back to the earliest days of the company, with the spectacular success of the Mac. The way they launched the Mac was, they went off in a separate building, raised a pirate flag out front, defied authority, and pulled off one of the biggest successes in history. So you instantly ingrained on everyone's mind that the way you do great things is you defy authority, you go do your own thing, you don't collaborate with anybody, and so forth -- some habits which are catastrophic in a large corporation. It is OK for a start-up, but it's a disaster for a big company. C O N T I N U E D . . . 3 of 3
SCHINDLER: Are they going to continue to exercise the discipline you introduced under Steve Jobs' leadership?
AMELIO: I have to confess, I have concerns. Steve's philosophies are quite a bit different than mine, relative to management. Relative to the technologies, we had an enormous amount of agreement. On the product choices, there was frankly very little disagreement between us. We tended to see things the same way in that regard.

But in terms of managing the troops, I am and have been, and am proud of the fact that I try to be a teacher. Instead of giving people the answer, I help them discover it on their own. Over the time I can build a management cadre of 1,000 middle managers who will make 1,000 good decisions a day -- something I could never do, no matter how brilliant I was. That is how you build strong, large organizations. When you have a small company, 30 to 40 people, one guy can make all the decisions and it probably works just fine. Again, when you want to build a large effective organization, you have to do it a different way.

SCHINDLER: What are you doing now?

"I would not forecast when the company was going to be profitable. It was clearly a mistake. I was pressured by the board. I should never have done it. My fault. Won't happen again."

AMELIO: I am very excited about it. I am with the Parkside Group. Three of us got together and said, "You know, what the buyout industry does not have is partners who have been CEOs and know how to run businesses." There are a lot of people with money, but money in today's world isn't that hard to get a hold of. We wanted to bring more value to it than that. We wanted to be able to offer to people who we do business with, people we invest in, not only our money, but our wisdom.

SCHINDLER: Would you take another CEO job in the technology industry if you were offered one?
AMELIO: I'm not looking for it. If the right circumstances came along, sure. I spent so many years as a CEO it is kind of a comfortable job for me, but it's not what I'm looking for. I consciously decided when I left Apple I wasn't going to look for another CEO role. I declined interview requests at that time. Something may come along in the future, after I have done some things I want to do, and so I don't want to rule anything out. It doesn't make any sense to burn your bridges.

SCHINDLER: If there was one decision you could change now at Apple, what would it have been?
AMELIO: I think most people would expect me to say "Buy NeXT," but I'm not going to say that, because it isn't what I really feel. One thing is, I would not forecast when the company was going to be profitable. It was clearly a mistake. I was pressured by the board. I should never have done it. My fault. Won't happen again.

The second thing I would have done is change my compensation package. I just took a compensation package that was essentially identical in structure to what I had at National [Semiconductor], just with the numbers a little bit bigger, which is what you figure you do when you change jobs.

I did not adequately appreciate the emotions surrounding that issue. If I were to do it again, I would take a very nominal salary, perhaps equivalent to what the average engineer was making in the company, but I would put a big pot of gold at the end of the rainbow, based on results. And I would have insisted that the board give me an iron-clad guarantee for those three years, rather than just a handshake. I would have wanted it contractual. I know that in those three years I would have gotten this thing going back in a positive direction. I think all the evidence is there today that this is starting to happen. My only concern is that Steve stay with the plan.